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This report is the fourth in a series of reports written in support of the 
United States Uranium Registry Program. The first report (PNL-3341 
USUR-Ol) entitled Occupational Exposures to Uranium: Processes, Hazards 
and Regulations - A Field Study of the Commercial Fuel Cycle was published 
in April 1981. The second report (USUR-02), entitled An Appraisal of Se­
lected Epidemiologic Issues From Studies of Lung Cancer Among Uranium and 
Hard Rock Miners was published in April 1982. The third report in this 
series (PNL-4438 USUR-03), Radiological Health Aspects of Commercial Uran­
ium Conversion, Enrichment, and Fuel Fabrication was published in November 
1982. The present report completes the review of radiological health practices 
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RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH ASPECTS OF URANIUM MILLING 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
The United States Uranium Registry (USUR) was founded in 1978 to 
investigate potential hazards from occupational exposure to uranium and to 
assess the need for special health-related studies of uranium workers. The... 
need for information on the behavior and effects of uranium in man was 
reinforced at the U. S. Energy Research and Development Administration's- Conference on Occupational Health Experience with Uranium in 1975. In 
response to this need, the U. S. Department of Energy provided funding to 
the Hanford Environmental Health Foundation to establish the USUR. Pacific 
Northwest Laboratory was later selected to provide health physics technical 
support to the USUR. 
The major goals of the Registry are to: 
... • 	 characterize the processes and the occupational health aspects of 
the uranium fuel cycle 
• 	 determine the concentration and distribution of uranium and its 
decay daughters in the tissues of exposed workers 
• 	 identify populations suitable for special health-related studies. -
Personnel working for the USUR have visited 35 uranium production and 
processing facilities to collect information toward accomplishment of these -
goals. Facilities visited include currently operating commercial uranium 
facilities (mines, mills, conversion plants, enrichment plants, and fuel fabri ­
cation plants) and several noncommercial and inactive uranium facilities. 
Information obtained to date covers general facility descriptions, process 
descriptions, radiological exposure data, regulatory requirements, radiological 
health practices, nonradiological exposure conditions, and occupational medi­
cine programs. The information-gathering phase of the program reinforced 
the original beliefs of the USUR staff that a post-mortem tissue program for 
uranium workers was needed. The current lack of relevant information on 
1 
the deposition, distribution, and retention of various uranium compounds in 
man greatly increases the difficulty of developing appropriate standards for 
uranium exposure and, consequently, worker protection policies and regula­
tions. The autopsy tissue analysis program will in due course provide that 
information. 
1.1 URANIUM MILLS AND NATURAL RADIOACTIVITY 
Uranium is a heavy metal of slight radioactivity which is found as a 
trace oxide in numerous mineral formations, rocks, and sands throughout the 
earth's crust. Naturally occurring uranium consists of 99.28 percent 238 U, 
0.72 percent 235u, and about 0.0054 percent 234U. 
Uranium mills process uranium ores that are mined from the ground. 
The uranium ore is crushed so that the small percentage of uranium in the 
rock can be extracted and concentrated. A semi-refined product commonly 
known as "yellowcake" is precipitated, dried, and packaged into drums for 
shipment to conversion plants and further chemical processing. Eventually 
the uranium is enriched, converted into metal oxide pellets, and loaded into 
rods for use as fuel elements at nuclear power plants. 
Uranium-238 is a long-lived parent of a chain of radioactive decay pro­
ducts which include thorium, radium, radon gas, and radon daughter pro­
ducts (Figure 1). The isotopes of this series emit alpha, beta, and gamma 
radiation of various energies and intensities. Although the concentration of 
radioactivity in uranium ore is low, special precautions are required to 
protect uranium mill workers from unnecessary and potentially harmful 
exposure to radioactivity in uranium ore dust, concentrate streams, and 
yellowcake product. Radiological protection is achieved when the source of 
the activity is understood, controlled, and monitored by the mill workers. 
2 





The purpose of this report is to describe the operation of conventional 
and unconventional uranium milling processes, the potential for occupational 
exposure to ionizing radiation at the mill, methods for radiological safety, 
methods of evaluating occupational radiation exposures, and current govern­
ment regulations for protecting workers and ensuring that standards for 
radiation protection are adhered to. In addition, a survey of current radio­
logical health practices is summarized. 
Note added at printing: This report was prepared shortly after the uranium 
industry experienced peak production and employment levels. More recently, 
however, this industry suffered a major recession and substantial production 
declines due to reduced demand for refined uranium yellowcake, cancellation 
of orders, and lower market prices. As a result, a number of facilities were 
closed down or operated at reduced production levels. The production data 
and employment levels for the uranium milling industry presented in this 
report are applicable to the time period 1980-1981. 
4 

2.0 PROCESS DESCRIPTIONS 
Uranium mills are located near major uranium deposits in the United 
States. These deposits are found primarily in the western states: 
New Mexico, Colorado, Wyoming, and Utah. Additional uranium is extracted 
from deposits in Washington, Texas, and Arizona, and as a by-product of 
phosphoric acid production in Florida and Louisiana (Figure 2). 
A number of different industrial processes have been implemented at 
uranium mills to extract and concentrate from the feedstock materialU30 S 
(Table 1). The chemistry of each process is matched with the geochemical 
characteristics of the ore feedstock material. Present-day uranium milling 
operations are sometimes classified into two general categories based on the- origin of the feedstock: 
• 	 conventional mills, which process uranium ores mined from under­
.... 
ground or open-pit mines 
• 	 unconventional mills, which process uranium-bearing solutions from 
in-situ solution mining, uranium recovery operations, or heap 
leaching operations . .. 
At present, conventional milling operations account for approximately 
90 percent of the uranium yellowcake produced in the United States. Solution 
mining produces about 6 percent of the total, uranium recovery from phos­
phoric acid processing about 3 percent, and heap leaching about 1 percent of 
.... 	 the total U. S. production. In addition, uranium is recovered as a by-product 
of copper, beryllium, and vanadium mining and smelting. 
The following is a brief description of the major process flows at 1) con­
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• CONVENTIONAL MILLS ~. U 
• SOLUTION MINES l 
o URANIUM RECOVERY OPERATIONS \ ......­
• HEAP-LEACHING OPERATIONS 
FIGURE 2. Uranium Mills in the United States Operating as of 1/1/80 (derived from DOE 1980) 
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TABLE 1. Currently Operating Uranium Production Mills (a) 
~lill 
Conventional ~1ills 
1) Anaconda Copper Company 
2) Atlas Minerals Corp. 
3) Bear Creek Uranium Co. 
4) Chevron Resources Co. 
5) Conoco-Pioneer Nuclear 
6) Cotter Corporation 
7) Dawn Mining Company... 
8) Exxon Minerals Company 
9) Federal-American 
Partners 
10) Kerr-~lcGee Nuclear Corp. 
... 
11) Pathfinder Mines Corp. 
12) Pathfinder Mines Corp. 
13) Petromies Company 
14) Rio Algom Corporation 
15) Sohio Natural Resources 
Company 
16) Union Carbide Corp. 
17) 	 Union Carbide Corp. 
18) 	United Nuclear Corp. 
19) 	 United Nuclear- Homestake 
Partners 
20) 	Western Nuclear, Inc. 
21) 	Western Nuclear, Inc. 
Location 
Grants, New ~lexico 
Moab, Utah 
Powder River Basin, Wyoming 
Hobson, Texas 
Falls City, Texas 
Canon City, Colorado 
Ford, Washington 
Powder River nasin, Wyoming 
Gas IliUs, Wyoming 
Grants, New ~Iexico 
Gas Hills, Wyoming 
Shirley Basin, Wyoming 
Shirley Basin, Wyoming 
LaSal, Utah 
Cebolleta, New Mexico 
Uravan, Colorado 
Natrona County, Wyoming 
Church Rock, New Mexico 
Grants, New Mexico 




Acid Leach, CCD(b), 
Solvent Extraction 




Acid Leach, CCD, 
Solvent Extraction 
Acid Leach, CCD, 
Solvent Extraction 





Acid Leach, CCD, 
Column Ion Exchange 
Acid Leach, CCD, 
Solvent Extraction 
Acid Leach, Eluex 
Acid Leach, CCD, 
Solvent Extraction 
Acid Leach, Eluex 
Acid Leach, CCD, 
Column Ion Exchange 
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TABLE 1. (continued) 
Year of 
Mill Location Startup 
Solution Mining Operations 
1) Everest Mineral Corp. Hobson. Texas 	 (c) 
2) IEC Corp. 	 Three Rivers. Texas (c) 
3) 	Mobil Oil Corp. Bruni. Texas (c) 
4) 	 Union Carbide Corp. Palangana. Texas (c) 








7) 	Uranium Resource. Inc. Bruni. Texas (c) 
8) 	Wyoming Mineral Corp. Bruni. Texas 1977 
9) 	Wyoming ~Iineral Corp. Three Rivers. Texas 1977 
10) Wyoming Mineral Corp. Irigaray. Wyoming (c) 
Uranium Recovery Operations(d) 




2) 	 Uranium Recovery Corp. Mulberry. Florida 1975 
3) 	Wyoming Mineral Corp. Pierce. Florida 1978 
4) 	Gardinier. Inc. Tampa. Florida 1979 
Mulberry. Florida 19795) 	New Wales Chemical. Inc. (e) 
Heap Leaching Operations (d) 
1) 	Durita Development Corp. Naturita. Colorado (c) 




3) 	 Union Carbide Corp. Maybell. Colorado (c) 
4) Wyoming Mineral Corp. Bingham Canyon. Utah (c) 
(a) 	The following references were used to compile this table: 
1) Statistical Data of the Uranium Industry. GJO-I00 (USD.OE 
1980). 
2) 	 Final Generic Environmental Impact Statement on Uranium 

Milling. NUREG-0706 (USNRC 1980). 

(b) 	Countercurrent decantation. 
(c) 	Not available. 
(d) 	This listing is of commercially operating sites; there are 

numerous research and development and pilot projects which 

are not listed. 

(e) 	Began commercial operation during 1980. 
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Conventional uranium milling involves ore crushing and grinding, chem­
ical leaching and separation, recovery of uranium by precipitation, drying, 
and packaging. However, the specific chemicals and type of equipment used 
to accomplish these steps can vary in considerable detail from one mill to 
another. Process variations are necessitated either by the geochemical com­
position of the ore, or developments in new technology with improved separa­
tion efficiencies. The primary milling processes currently utilized in the 
industry are: 
acid leach, solvent extraction• 
• acid leach, ion exchange 
• acid leach, Eluex separation, or 
• alkaline leach, resin-in-pulp concentration. 
Approximately SO percent of the conventional mills in the U. S. use an acid 
leach process, and the remaining 20 percent use an alkaline leach process. 
Acid leach is preferred for ores with low lime content (usually 12 percent or 
less). The alkaline (or carbonate) leach process is used for ores with high 
lime content that would otherwise require large quantities of acid for neutral­
ization. The most common process is acid leach with solvent extraction. Cur­
rently 11 out of 22 mills operating use this process (Table 1). 
The four basic divisions of the conventional milling process flow are: 

• ore handling and preparation 

• extraction 
• concentration and purification 
• precipitation. 
The variations in chemical process for these divisions are diagrammed in 
Figure 3. The following sections provide a detailed discussion of the steps 
involved in each process division. 
2.1.1 Ore Handling and Preparation 
Uranium-bearing ore is transported to the mill and weighed. The ore is 
then analyzed for moisture content and percentage U30 S. An accurate as­
sessment of the moisture content is important for several reasons. First, 
the amount of ore fed into the mill is determined according to dry-ton 
9 

CONCENTRATION ANDlORE HANDLING AND PREPARATION I EXTRACTION PRECIPITATIONPURIFICATION 
I--+~ 
CHEMICAL DRYING AND 
RESIN-IN-PULP """--~PRECIPITATION PACKAGING 
SOLVENT EXTRACTION ............--., 

ORE GRINDING 
FIGURE 3. Flow Diagram of Basic Conventional Milling Steps 
equivalents. Secondly, dust control becomes increasingly important as the 
moisture content of the ore decreases. In some cases the amount of moisture 
present can influence the selection of chemical processes used to separate out 
the uranium. 
The ore is dumped into a receiving area, where individual lots of ore 
can be segregated and processed according to need. The ore is then selected 
by the operator and moved by front-end loaders to a screen-like "grizzly," 
where the ore can drop into the primary crusher. The ore is often blended 
with lots from different ore pads. The process of blending ore is performed 
to ensure that the feed material has physical and chemical characteristics that 
will enable the U30S extraction process to proceed with maximum efficiency. 
The primary crusher chops the ore into pieces that are less than 15 cm 
(6 inches) in diameter. A secondary crusher is employed to reduce the ore 
to pebbles 2-4 cm (0.S-1.5 inches) in diameter. Either impact-type or cone 
gyratory crushers may be used, depending upon the hardness of the ore. 











crushing operation for dust control. The exhaust air passes through a dust 
collector prior to its discharge into the atmosphere. 
Upon leaving the secondary crusher, the crushed ore is transferred 
along a broad conveyor belt system to the sample station and the fine ore 
storage bins. Samples are taken to determine the content of theU30 8 
crushed ore. The fine ore storage bins generally have a capacity of about 
twice the rated daily mill capacity. 
Ore from the storage bins is transferred via a conveyor belt system to 
the grinding circuit. Ore for the alkaline leach process requires finer grind­
ing (200 mesh) than ore for the acid leach process (28 mesh). Ballor rod 
mills are used to wet grind ores into an ore slurry that is 50 to 70 percent 
solids. 
2.1. 2 Extraction 
Up to this point in the process, only water has been added to the 
crushed ore. It is now ready for chemical extraction of U30 8 . The ore 
slurry is pumped to the leaching agitators, where sulfuric acid (H2SO 4) and 
the oxidants sodium chlorate (NaCl03) or manganese dioxide (Mn02) are added 
if the process is acid leach. If the process is alkaline leach, then the 
oxidant sodium carbonate (Na2C03) is added. 
In the acid leaching process, a number of leaching tanks are arranged in 
series for the uranium slurry to pass through. Metals, such as uranium, 
that solubilize in sulfuric acid, are dissolved. The addition of oxidant speeds 
up the leaching and improves the recovery of uranium. The slurry is con­
tinuously mixed for 3 to 20 hours, depending upon the dissolution char­
acteristics of the ore. 
The ore slurry from the acid leaching tanks then undergoes a liquid­
solid separation process or a sand-slime separation process. The liquid-solid 
separation process used in 13 of 17 acid leach mills is a countercurrent 
decantation (CCD) circuit designed to separate the uranium-bearing solution 
from undissolved solids. Water is the principal washing medium. Flocculants 
(chemical agents) are usually added to this circuit to accelerate the settling 
11 

rates of undissolved solids. Following the liquid-solid separation process, 
the liquid phase containing the uranium is clarified by passage through sand 
filters, activated-carbon filters, or anthracite coal filters. The solution is 
then ready for the concentration and purification phase. 
Some acid leach mills use a sand-slime separation circuit where the pro­
duct is a slurry containing about five to seven percent solids. These mills 
utilize cyclone classifiers for centrifugal separation of the heavier sand 
particles from the slime. The sand exits the phase from the bottom of the 
cyclones. The sand slurry is fed into a rake classifier circuit, where it can 
be washed with an acidic water solution using counter-current decantation. 
The uranium separates from the sand and is passed on to the concentration 
and purification phase. The barren sand tailings are pumped onto piles for 
dewatering. 
The overall extraction process for the alkaline leach mills is similar to 
acid leach mills. Leaching of uranium from ore occurs in a series of agitated 
tanks, and the ore slurry from the tanks undergoes a liquid-solid separation 
process to isolate the uranium-bearing solution from the undissolved solids. 
2.1.3 Concentration and Purification 
This step of the milling process uses one of several chemical methods to 
concentrate and purify the feed solution from the extraction step. The 
methods vary somewhat between acid and alkaline mills. 
Acid Leach Mills. Acid leaching is a nonselective process that results in 
the dissolution of elements other than uranium and the production of a low­
grade uranium solution. This low-grade uranium solution is concentrated and 
purified by one of three processes: solvent extraction, ion exchange, or 
Eluex. The process used by individual mills is determined by ore characteris­
tics. A brief description of each of the three processes follows: 
• 	 The solvent extraction process is used in 10 out of the 17 acid leach 
mills. Uranium in the feed solution is extracted into an organic 
phase and subsequently stripped into an aqueous phase. The sol­













the feed solution and organic solvent flowing countercurrently. In 
this first phase, sulfate ions from the organic solution are exchanged 
for uranium ions from the feed solution. In the second phase, the 
organic solvent solution containing the uranium is mixed with a con­
centrated ammonium sulfate, chloride, or sodium carbonate stripping 
solution, which results in the uranium ions being transferred to the 
aqueous solution. The aqueous ammonium sulfate, chloride, or 
sodium carbonate solution now contains the uranium in a concentrated 
form. 
• 	 The ion exchange process for concentrating uranium can be used for 

the treatment of both pulps and clarified feed solutions from the 

extraction phase. Currently, three acid leach mills use this pro­

cess. Feed solutions or pulps pass through the- ion exchange 

columns where dissolved uranium ions are adsorbed into resin beads. 

A rinsing solution commonly referred to as an eluting solution 

(chloride, nitrate, bicarbonate, or an ammonium sulfate/sulfuric acid 

solution) is then passed through the column, stripping the uranium 

from the resin in a concentrated form. 

• 	 The Eluex process is a combination of the ion exchange and solvent 

extraction processes, and is currently in use in four mills. Slime 

pulp from the extraction phase is contacted with ion-exchange 

resins, which are then eluted with sulfuric acid. The sulfuric acid 

solution containing the uranium is placed into a solvent extraction 

process for further concentration. Advantages of the Eluex process 

are attainment of a purer end-product and elimination of the require­

ments for nitrate and chloride agents. 

Alkaline Leach Mills. The alkaline leach process has a greater selectivity 
for extracting uranium than the acid leach process. Therefore, three of four 
alkaline leach mills have no concentration and purification step. The clarified 
solutions from the extraction phase proceed directly to precipitation. The 
alkaline leach process of the dual acid-alkaline leach mill uses a resin-in-pulp 
(RIP) process for concentrating the uranium. RIP is an ion-exchange type 
process in which resin-filled cubical baskets are moved up and down in a 
13 

tank containing uranium-bearing pulp from the extraction phase. Uranium is 
extracted by circulating eluant and wash solutions through the resin in a 
series of tanks. 
2.1.4 Precipitation and Packaging 
The acid strip solution, which now contains the concentrated uranium, is 
pumped to the precipitation circuit, where uranium is caused to drop out of 
the solution in a solidified form. For acid leach mills, the feed solution to 
the precipitation phase is an acidified chloride, nitrate, or sulfate solution 
enriched in uranium. An alkaline carbonate solution is the feed for the pre­
cipitation phase of the alkaline leach mills. 
There are three methods of precipitating yellowcake in acid leach mills. 
One method is a two-stage process used when iron and sulfate impurities are 
significant. In the first stage, lime is added to the feed material to attain a 
pH of about 4.0 and separate iron hydroxide and sulfate impurities. Next, 
caustic soda (sodium hydroxide), magnesia, or ammonia is added to attain pH 
of 6.5 to S. 0 and precipitate the uranium in the form of ammonium diuranate, 
(NH4)2U207. A second method, the addition of hot air and ammonia to an 
appropriate pH, will precipitate an ammonium diuranate compound. A third 
method is precipitation with hydrogen peroxide (H20 2). The latter method 
can be used when a purer product is desired. The uranium is precipitated 
as a hydrated uranium peroxide (U04•2H20). 
The principal method of precipitating uranium from the alkaline feed 
material is addition of caustic soda (sodium hydroxide) to a pH of 12.0. The 
uranium will precipitate as an insoluble sodium diuranate compound (Na2U20 7). 
If sodium levels are too high to allow marketing of U30 S ' the sodium can be 
removed by dissolving the sodium diuranate in sulfuric acid and re-precipi­
tating with ammonia, yielding an ammonium diuranate compound. 
The final stages in the production of are dewatering, filtering,U30 S 
washing, drying, and packaging. These stages are similar for both acid and 
alkaline leach mills. The precipitated yellowcake is dewatered in thickeners, 
filtered, and washed. The resulting filter cake is then dried in either a 
continuous steam-heated dryer at 100° to 150°C, or a multiple-hearth dryer at 











yellow-colored product high in ammonium diuranate (ADU). Mills that dry 
their product at higher temperatures (370 0 to 53S 0 C) will convert ADU to a 
greenish black powder high in uranium oxide (U30 S)' Drying the product at 
high temperatures also decomposes many of the impurities (such as sulfates). 
The dry product contains SO to 96 percent uranium as U30 S' U03, and/or 
ammonium diuranate. Lastly, the yellowcake product is crushed, if neces­
sary, and packaged in 55-gallon steel drums for shipment. Product weight 
per drum is 300 to 400 kg, depending upon the product density. 
Conventional mills are rated according to their ore-processing capacity 
(tons of ore processed per day or TPD). The largest conventional mill has a 
rated capacity of 7000 TPD, the smallest 450 TLD (Table 1). 
2.2 UNCONVENTIONAL MILLING PROCESS 
The three major unconventional milling processes in the United States are 
solution (in-situ) mining, uranium recovery operations, and heap leaching . 
These processes account for approximately 10 percent of the total yellowcake 
production, but could contribute considerably larger percentages of the total 
yellowcake production if uranium ore deposits obtained by conventional mining 
methods become further depleted . 
As of January 1, 19S0, 10 solution mines were operating, primarily in 
southern Texas. Four uranium recovery operations were located in Florida 
and Louisiana, and four heap-leaching operations were scattered throughout 
the western United States. The yellowcake production capacity of unconven­
tional operations ranges from 125 to 500 tons (113 to 454 t) per year (in the 
range of small-capacity conventional mills). 
2.2.1 Solution Mining 
Most of the commercially active solution mmmg is concentrated in south­
ern Texas near the Gulf coast (see Table 1). Solution mining involves the 
injection of a leach solution into a subterranean uranium-bearing ore body to 
dissolve and complex the uranium, the mobilization of the uranium complex 
formed, and the surface recovery of the uranium from uranium-bearing solu­
tion by pumping the leaching solution back to the mill. Depending on the ore 
type, either an acidic or a basic oxidizing leach solution is injected into and 
15 

withdrawn from the ore body via sets of wells. Ore grades are highly vari ­
able, but usually contain less than 1 percent uranium by weight. 
Once the leach solution is pumped from the ground, it undergoes con­
centration and purification. Most locations use ion exchange columns to con­
centrate the uranium, followed by ammonium precipitation. The yellowcake 
precipitate is clarified, filtered, dried, and packaged by a method similar to 
those in conventional mills. 
2.2.2 Uranium Recovery Operations 
Large deposits of phosphate ores in Florida and Idaho are mined and 
processed into phosphate products (such as fertilizer). These deposits 
generally contain 50 to 200 ppm uranium (0.005-0.02 percent), or only about 
five to ten percent of the uranium concentration found in commercially mined 
ores. However, the vast phosphate reserves are gaining new importance as a 
source for by-product uranium. Currently, there are five plants with the 
capability to extract uranium from wet phosphoric acid. 
In commercial phosphate production, sulfuric acid is used to digest the 
phosphate ore yielding dilute phosphoric acid (30 percent P205) and calcium 
sulfate. Uranium is extracted from this dilute P2°5' Uranium extraction 
plants borrow the phosphoric acid from the commercial phosphate plants, 
extract the uranium, and return the phosphoric acid back to the phosphate 
A solvent extraction process is used to extract uranium from the 
Because of the high humic (organic material) content in phosphate 
ores, which interferes with uranium extraction, separation of the organic 
material is necessary prior to uranium recovery. 
2.2 . 3 Heap-Leaching 
The heap-leaching process can be used on old copper, vanadium, and 
uranium tailings piles and low-grade ore dumps, or when the ore body is 
small or situated far from a conventional mill. It involves leaching of ore or 
tailings either by gravitational flow through an open pile or by flooding a 
confined ore pile. 
The basic process involves percolating a seven to ten percent H2S04 
solution through the ore or tailings piles with the enriched solution collected 
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from the bottom of the pile. Some operations use plain water as the leaching 
solution. The enriched (uranium-bearing) solution then can either be shipped 
to a conventional mill and added to the concentration and purification phase 
or processed by solvent extraction or ion exchange and precipitated at the 






3.0 OCCUPATIONAL RADIATION EXPOSURE 

Uranium mills process ore containing relatively small amounts of radio­
active materials. Radiation exposures to mill workers occur primarily from 
exposure to gamma, alpha, and beta-emitting members of the uranium series 
decay chain (Figure 2) which are present in the mill feedstock, process solu­
tions, and yellowcake product. The greatest potential for occupational radia­
tion exposure in uranium mills results from inhalation of uranium and its 
decay products in aerosol suspensions. Of secondary importance is the occupa­
tional exposure attributable to external gamma and beta radiation. 
In the early days of the Manhattan Project, uranium was not considered 
to be a hazardous material because of its low specific activity and low gamma 
emission rate. Little was known about the biological effects of alpha and beta 
particles. The importance of radon and its daughter products was not fully 
realized until many years later when underground uranium miners began exper­
iencing an increased lung cancer mortality. Throughout the 1950s, the de­
mand for uranium for the nuclear weapons program stimulated a rapid increase 
in uranium exploration activities. Several mills were constructed and operated 
during this period. 
The first radiological surveys at uranium mills were performed with 
simple Geiger-Mueller (G-M) counters and scintillometers. The primary con­
cern was directed toward external gamma radiation. Later, radon daughter 
measurements were performed in the mills by counting air-filter samples with 
an ion chamber survey meter (Wilde 1975). 
Eventually it was determined that the greatest potential for occupational 
radiation exposure in uranium mills was attributable to inhalation of airborne 
particulate material containing uranium or its decay series daughters. These 
materials include the long-lived alpha emitters (uranium, thorium, and radium) 
present in ore dust, the short-lived decay progeny of radon gas, and yellow­
cake dust (concentrated uranium). 
In the following sections, the various source materials and the potential 
for occupational radiation exposure are discussed for each of the four stages 
of uranium milling: ore handling and preparation, extraction, concentration 








3.1 ORE HANDLING AND PREPARATION 
The most important source of occupational radiation exposure to workers 
in the ore handling and crushing areas of the mill is inhaled uranium ore 
dust. Dust is generated by ore hauling equipment and mechanical rock­
crushing equipment. There is no ore handling or crushing phase at uncon­
ventional milling operations. 
' 1 I' d I'd' d t 238U 234U 226RThe maJor ong- Ive nuc I es In ore us are , , 230Th , a, 
and 210po . These long-lived alpha emitters are present in approximate equi­
librium in dust generated in the mill from rock crushing, grinding, sizing, 
sampling, and transfer operations. 
Moist ores generally result in smaller quantities of airborne dust. Dust 
levels in the work areas are controlled by a dust collection and removal 
system (and supplemental water sprays, if necessary). 
Uranium ore dusts are characterized by their large particle size (2-30 lJm 
activity median aerodynamic diameter, or AMAD). Such relatively large aero­
sols tend to become trapped in the upper airways before they can enter the 
deep lung. Most radionuclides present in uranium ore dust are insoluble in 
lung fluids and are removed from the body at a very slow rate (Kalkwarf 
1979, Fisher 1982). In general, the specific activity of uranium ores is low, 
and radiation exposures received by crusher workers due to external pene­
trating radiation or inhaled alpha- and beta-emitting dust particles are usually 
maintained well below currently established guidelines for radiation protection. 
Nonetheless, federal regulations limit the permissible concentration of radio­
active materials in the air that is breathed. Operational guidelines have been 
derived in terms of maximum permissible concentrations (MPCs) which, during 
a 40-hour-per-week occupational exposure, should not permit the dose to cer­
tain important body organs from inhalation of radioactive materials to exceed 
maximum permissible levels. Current MPCs for individual radionuclides in air 
and water and for restricted (occupational) areas and unrestricted areas 
(such as those that are accessible by members of the general public) are 
given in Title 10, Part 20 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR 1980). 
Separate values are provided for soluble (in body fluids) and insoluble forms 
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of the radionuclides. The estimated degree of hazard associated with expos­
ure to radionuclides is reflected in these values; the lower the MPC, the more 
hazardous the radionuclide. Among members of the 238U decay series, the 
radionuclide with the lowest MPC is 230Th . 
Since 1960, the Code of Federal Regulations has contained a special 
proVIsIon for the limiting value of a mixture of radionuclides consisting of 
238 U and its daughters in uranium ore dust prior to the chemical separation 
of uranium from the ore at the mill. The operational limits for airborne 
uranium ore dust according to this provision are currently given in Note 4 of 
Appendix B (10 CFR Part 20) as 10-10 j.lCi/mt gross alpha activity and 
5 x 10-11 j.lCi/mt natural uranium in air. The use of these special MPCs has 
been favored by the uranium industry, since it is difficult to chemically 
separate the uranium series radionuclides and measure the activity of each 
radionuclide individually. 
Another potential occupational exposure in the ore handling operations is 
the inhalation of radon and radon daughters. Radon and its short-lived 
daughters (218po , 214pb , 214Bi , and 214po) are present wherever radium 
(226Ra) is found. Radon is a noble gas and is thus chemically inert. It 
migrates easily from radium-bearing materials and may collect in confines of 
the mill such as the area beneath the crushing machinery. 
Radon's relatively short half-life allows daughter products to form in the 
air. These decay products attach to dust particles, or they can be inhaled 
directly as free ions. Inhaled radon daughters deposit most of their energy 
in the tracheobronchial airways, and present some degree of hazard to 
workers. 
It is possible that the greatest health hazards facing crusher workers 
are nonradiological in nature: accidents involving machinery and equipment, 
and inhalation of silica dust. Most mills have dust collection systems in 
crushing and ore bin storage areas which keep concentrations of silica dust 
and of the various nuclides in ore dust well below appropriate maximum per­
missible concentrations. Some mills also require workers to wear respirators 





3.2 EXTRACTION PROCESSES 
The uranium is in solution during this phase of the milling process, and 
therefore of little hazard to workers. Gamma exposures are also relatively 
insignificant because of the low concentration of photon emitters in the 
slurry. Nonradiologically, sulfur dioxide and sulfuric acid gases may be 
vented from leaching tanks. Although airborne concentrations of the gases 
are not well defined, exposures are thought to be minimal since workers 
spend little time in this area. 
3.3 CONCENTRATION AND PURIFICATION 
The uranium continues in solution during concentration and purification, 
and there is little potential for occupational exposure to radioactive materials. 
During maintenance operation when tanks and equipment have been drained, 
the potential exists for exposure to deposited 226Ra . The hazard appears to 
be greatest when surfaces are scraped or brushed down, giving the radium 
an opportunity to become airborne and inhaled by the worker. Nonradio­
logically, solvent extraction tanks exhaust vapors from the kerosene base 
liquid. Occupational exposures are therefore low--as long as the ventilation 
system is intact and functioning properly. Since the extraction solvent is 
extremely flammable, sprinkler systems and tank release capabilities are 
utilized to combat the potential problem of fire in the mills. 
3.4 PRECIPITATION AND PACKAGING 
The mill process of greatest concern to health physicists is the pre­
cipitation, drying, and packaging area of the mill. Chronic or accidental 
acute inhalation of yellowcake dust represents the highest potential for 
occupational exposure at the mill. 
Defining the hazard of yellowcake inhalation is a difficult problem since 
the term "yellowcake" refers to a variety of compounds with different color, 
chemical composition, and solubility in lung fluids. The final yellowcake 
product usually comprises the following compounds in varying percentages: 
ammonium diuranate [(NH4)2U207]' sodium diuranate (Na2U20 7), uranium 
trioxide (U03), and uranium oxide (U30 S). The solubilities of the above 
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compounds depend not only on chemical composition but also on the nature of 
the physical and chemical processes used to obtain them (Cooke and Holt 
1974). Therefore, yellowcake produced at two different mills may have 
different solubilities owing to different chemical precipitation processes and 
drying temperatures. 
The precipitated product from the mills is primarily ammonium diuranate 
(ADU). During the drying process ADU is thermally decomposed to U30 S with 
U03 as an intermediate product. Generally U03 is formed at temperatures 
between 2600 and 4000 C, above 4000 C U03 decomposes into U30 S ' and bet­
ween 650 0 and SOooC conversion to U30 S is complete. 
The ADU precipitate is dried in either a steam-heated dryer at 100 0 to 
1500 C, or in a multiple-hearth furnace at 3700 to 53SoC. Mills using a steam­
heated dryer produce essentially 100 percent ADU for packaging. The situa­
tion is much more complex for mills that use a multiple-hearth furnace to dry 
the precipitated ADU. The composition of the final yellowcake product is 
predominantly uranium oxide, although many impurities (nitrates, sulfates, 
and ammonium compounds) may also be present. 
Ammonium diuranate exhibits Class D solubility characteristics (Kalkwarf 
1979), whereas yellowcake obtained from high temperature drying operations 
may exhibit partial Class D and predominantly Class Y solubility character­
istics (Dennis et al. 1982). Thus, any ADU dust inhaled by workers during 
the drying or packaging process will be readily transported away from the 
worker's lungs and excreted. For such Class D compounds chemical toxicity 
constitutes a greater health hazard than potential radiation effects. In 
contrast, Class Y compounds are less soluble in the lungs, and are therefore 
retained in the lungs with long biological clearance half-times. The potential 
radiation hazard of uranium oxide is of greater importance than its chemical 
toxicity. The solubility classification scheme for inhaled materials is defined 
and discussed further in Section 5.0. 
Mill workers may be exposed to yellowcake dust during routine operation 
of dryers, during drum-filling and sealing, and during maintenance on equip­
ment where yellowcake product has accumulated. Dry forms of yellowcake are 
more likely to become airborne and inhaled by workers than moist compounds 








4.0 METHODS FOR RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION 
The objective of a radiological protection program is to maintain radiation 
exposures to workers as low as can reasonably be achieved. The purpose of 
this section is to describe general methods by which radiation hazards at 
uranium mills may be identified and controlled. While it is recognized that 
uranium mills also release low levels of effluent radioactive materials to the 
surrounding environment through stack emissions and tailings pond or pile 
noncontainment, the scope of the present report is limited to indoor protection 
of mill workers. Five aspects of radiological protection are discussed: 
• organizational responsibilities 
• facility monitoring 
• exposure control 
• training 
• recordkeeping. 
Responsibility for an effective safety program is shared by the mill 
managers, the Radiation Safety Officer and his assistants, and the workers 
themselves. An efficient organization structure is essential for establishing 
and enforcing policy and procedures, procuring essential equipment and quali ­
fied personnel, and conducting internal audits and inspections of the radiation 
protection program. 
The most important pathway of exposure for uranium industry workers is 
the inhalation of radioactive airborne contaminants. Exposure control is 
achieved through containment and dust control design engineering, the proper 
use of respirators and protective clothing, and employee training programs. 
Concentrations of radioactive materials in the breathing air are determined by 
facility monitoring instrumentation. Recordkeeping involves maintaining 
records of facility monitoring and exposure evaluation data. 
Rigid radiological health practices are a requirement of the operating 
licenses for uranium production facilities, but inadvertent exposures continue 
to occur, indicating that further improvements are necessary. In the follow­
ing paragraphs, the various aspects of a quality radiological protection pro­
gram are discussed. Methods for evaluating routine or accidental exposures 
are discussed later. 
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4.1 	 ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 
The foundation of an efficient radiation protection program is strong 
support and involvement by upper management. The manager should appoint 
a trained Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) and confer upon him the authority 
and responsibility necessary to achieve an acceptable level of safety. An 
effective program will be one that fully complies with applicable laws and 
regulations--while having minimum impact on mill operation and productivity. 
Management should work closely with the radiation protection staff, and 
provide the financial and technical support required. The Radiation Safety 
Officer should communicate needed resources, training programs, and pro­
cedures, and report on the daily activities of his staff. Open communication 
is an essential element in a successful program. The RSO should report dir­
ectly to the resident mill manager. Together the manager and the RSO 
should develop procedures that constitute the optimum radiological protection 
program. 
The RSO should supervise the health physics technical staff responsible 
for the routine program. He should insure compliance with regulatory re-' 
quirements and provide the necessary training needed by all employees at the 
mill. All mill workers are responsible for adhering to operating procedures 
and company policies. Accidents or noncompliance should be reported to the 
RSO. Often the employees can suggest improvements in existing policies and 
procedures, and work with the RSO to see that the objectives of the radiation 
protection program are carried out. 
It is important to periodically review, audit, and evaluate the effective­
ness of the radiation protection program. Quality assurance reviews, under 
the direction of the mill manager, should be conducted to ensure that program 
activities are performed in accordance with written procedures. 
The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is currently drafting regulatory 
guides that pertain to practices at uranium mills for ensuring that occupa­
tional radiation exposures will be "as low as reasonably achievable" (ALARA). 
Mill management and the health physics staff should become familiar with 
existing and proposed regulatory guides dealing with methods for more effec­











4.2 FACILITY MONITORING 
Many conditions and processes are monitored at uranium mills. This 
section describes methods of monitoring the working atmosphere for airborne 
radioactivity and surveying the facility for external gamma radiation. Per­
sonnel monitoring and dose evaluation are discussed later. 
Monitoring of working locations in uranium facilities is required by 
Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations. The purpose is to insure that 
employees are not exposed to levels of radioactivity in excess of established 
limits. Each licensee is required to perform surveys and measurements of 
radiation levels or concentrations as may be necessary to comply with the 
federal regulations. Individual monitoring programs are required to fulfill the 
specific needs of the facility, and therefore tend to be somewhat nonuniform. 
The selection of monitoring locations is determined by consideration of 
the quantities of radioactive materials in the production processes, their 
potential for escape from the system into the workplace, and their proximity 
to the worker. The frequency of sampling is dictated by the magnitude of 
the measurements routinely obtained so that the higher the results, the more 
frequently the surveys must be performed. Location and frequency of mon­
itoring and sample collection are determined by the individual mills and are 
included in the source material license application (subject to approval by the 
licensing authority). Depending on the specific requirements and potential 
for worker exposure, sampling may be continuous, daily, monthly, quarterly, 
or annually. Samples are usually taken at or above the breathing zone level 
for respirable ore dusts, yellowcake, other chemical forms of uranium, radon, 
or radon daughters, and at the height of the reproductive organs (one meter) 
for external gamma radiation. 
A discussion of facility monitoring may be divided into three general 
categories: 
• air monitoring 
• gamma radiation surveillance 
• surveys for surface contamination. 
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4.2.1 Air Monitoring 
There is general agreement that airborne radioactivity represents the 
major radiological health hazard at uranium mills. The indoor breathing air at 
uranium mills should be monitored for indication of excessive levels of respir­
able radioactivity. Three separate exposure categories are considered: 
inhalation of long-lived alpha-emitters (uranium, thorium, and• 
radium) present in uranium ore dust, 
• 	 inhalation of the short-lived decay products of radon gas, and 
• 	 inhalation of various forms of yellowcake, the composition of which is 

determined by the chemical process and the drying temperature. 

Breathing air should be sampled periodically or continuously, depending 
upon the degree of hazard present. A variety of instruments may be used. 
These include both portable and fixed-location air filter pumps, lapel sam­
plers, and instant working level meters. Lapel and high-volume samplers are 
commonly used during special maintenance activities or in areas of potential 
release not monitored by fixed-location instruments. 
Air filters may be either cellulose-asbestos, membrane-type (millipore), 
or glass fibre in construction, depending upon the method chosen for radio­
metric analysis. The two main methods of uranium assay are fluorometry and 
direct alpha counting. Air concentrations are commonly reported in units of 
milligrams or microcuries of uranium per cubic meter air. 
4.2.1.1 Sampling for Long-Lived Alpha Emitters 
The crushing, grinding, and ore storage areas of the mill should be 
sampled for respirable airborne particulates containing long-lived members of 
" "d h" (238 U 234U 230Th 226R ) Th t" althe uranIum serIes ecay c mn , , , a . e opera Ion 
limits for airborne uranium ore dust are specified in 10 CFR, Part 20, 
Appendix B as 10-10 llCi/mR. gross alpha activity and 5 x 10 -llllCi/mR. natural 
uranium in air" 
Air samples are usually collected using portable or fixed-station air 












counted using direct alpha counting techniques, or are analyzed for uranium 
content using standard fluorometric methods. Results are reported in units 
of gross alpha activity or milligrams of natural uranium per volume of air. 
The frequency of air sampling varies widely throughout the milling 
industry, but generally samples are obtained or filters are changed on a 
monthly or weekly basis. More frequent sampling may be required in high 
dust zones of the mill crushing area. 
4.2.1.2 Sampling for Radon and Radon Daughters 
Radon and its daughter products are generated by the radioactive decay 
of 226Ra , and are therefore found wherever radium is present. Radon, being 
a noble gas, migrates into the air and is transported by air streams away 
from the source. Ventilation is a primary method of reducing radon concentra­
tions in the workplace. 
Radon is limited to 30 pCi/R. (3 x 10-8 llCi/mR.) in air by 10 CFR, 
Part 20, and radon daughters are correspondingly limited to 0.3 WL. (a) Air 
sampling for radon and daughters is generally performed on a routine basis; 
however, the measured concentrations rarely exceed the established occupa­
tional limits. These materials concentrate in closed-in areas, and monitoring 
can indicate when increased ventilation is needed. 
A number of different techniques have been developed for direct mea­
surement of radon (Table 2). Since radon concentrations may vary by an 
order of magnitude over short periods of time, many grab samples or con­
tinuous radon monitoring are usually required to establish the average annual 
levels. Single measurements may provide a faulty indication of annual 
average, maximum, or minimum levels at a particular location. 
(a) 	Working Level - A working level is equivalent to any combination of radon 
daughters in one liter of air which will result in the emission of 
1.3 x 10 5 MeV of alpha energy in the complete decay through 214po. 
This potential alpha energy will occur when 100 pCil R. of 222Rn in air is 
in equilibrium with its daughter products. 
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The dose to workers from inhalation of radon and daughter products is 
due primarily to deposition of radon daughters in the airways of the respira­
tory tract. Several methods are available for measuring radon daughter con­
centrations in air (Table 3). Radon daughter concentrations are reported in 
units of working level (WL) or working level hours (WL-hr) . One working 
level month (WLM) is the equivalent of .170 WL-hr. A state-of-the-art dis­
cussion on the methods that can be used to survey the mill and surrounding 
areas for radon and radon daughters is published elsewhere (Atomic Indus­
trial Forum 1977). 
4.2.1.3 Sampling for Airborne Yellowcake Dust 
Air sampling for suspended uranium aerosols is of great importance in the 
yellowcake precipitation, drying, and packaging areas of the mill. Continuous 
monitoring of the air in breathing zones should be performed by fixed-location 
air sampling equipment. In addition, lapel samplers may be worn by workers 
to better determine the level of uranium in the breathing atmosphere. The 
10 CFR, Part 20 limit for airborne yellowcake dust is 0.2 mg uranium/m3 air. 
The mill process and equipment used have much influence on the levels of 
yellowcake dust generated. Dry processes tend to produce much greater 
levels of dust. Newer equipment is designed to reduce the amount of dust 
released into the air or up the stack. Bag filters collect dust and return it 
to the process. In addition, the biological hazard of yellowcake is strongly 
dependent upon its solubility characteristics. It is likely that regulatory 
agencies will require future tests of yellowcake dust solubility to aid in the 
interpretation of airborne uranium measurements. 
4.2.2 Gamma Radiation Monitoring 
The major portion of the above-background external gamma radiation is 
attributable to 226 Ra . In most uranium ores, radium is found in secular 
equilibrium with the uranium decay series. In concentrating uranium at the 
mill, radium is separated from the product and is discarded as part of the 




TABLE 2. 	 Selected Methods for Determining Radon Concentrations in Air 
Method 	 Application Sensitivity Comments 
Lucas cell scintilla­ Grab or continuous <0.1 pCil R, 
tion flask Inexpensive, gen­
erally reliable 
Two filter, delayed Grab or continuous <0.1 pCil R, 
counting 
Air collection and Grab or continuous 0.05 pCil R, 
counting 
Passive inverted funnel Continuous 0.05 pCi/R, }
with TLD chips Quiet, effective 
for integration, 
.- Activated charcoal Continuous 0.01 pCil R, inexpensive 
collections 
Track etch dosimeters Continuous 100 pCil R, 	 Inexpensive, 
track counting 
required 
TABLE 3. 	 Selected Methods for Determining Radon Daughter 
Concentrations in Air 
Method 	 Application Sensitivity Comments 
Kusnetz and Tsivoglou Grab sampling 0.0005 WL Commonly used, 
filters simple, and 
inexpensive -
Modified Kusnetz method Grab sampling 0.0005 WL 	 Integration 
device or alpha 
spectrometer 
required 
Integrating pump Continuous 1 WL-hr Noise, requires 
sampler with TLD 120 V AC power 
detector 
Alpha track etch film Continuous 5 WL-hr 	 Inexpensive, but 
track counting 
required 
Instant working level Grab sampling 0.01 WL Portable, quick, 




Area monitoring for external radiation is performed with calibrated port­
able survey instruments such as the Geiger-Mueller (G-M) counters, scintilla­
tion counters (Micro R-Meter), or equivalent. G-M counters are sensitive to 
detection levels as low as about 0.02 mR/hr, and scintillation detectors are 
reasonably accurate at the 0.003 mR/hr level. 
Technicians should perform gamma radiation surveys throughout the mill 
at least once per month. External survey results within a mill may range 
from 0.02 to 0.5 mR/hr. Higher radiation levels (1 to 3 mR/hr) may be de­
tected in the yellowcake drying and packaging areas, above some of the ore 
storage piles, and in the vicinity of tailings ponds. Radium also tends to 
accumulate in piping (especially elbows), where it is easy to detect but 
difficult to remove. Mill personnel should take survey readings prior to any 
maintenance operations. 
Some facilities continuously monitor external radiation levels using 
thermoluminescent dosimeter chips (TLDs) or film dosimeters placed through­
out the process areas. The dosimeters are exchanged monthly or quarterly 
by service contractors and evaluated. 
Results of all surveys must be recorded and maintained for a period of 
at least two years. Failure to do so, or failure to retain adequate records of 
such surveys constitutes a violation of state or federal regulations. Regular 
calibration of survey instruments and periodic auditing of survey data by 
management personnel are also required by the licensing authority. 
4.2.3 Contamination Control Surveys 
Surface contamination surveys should be conducted periodically in all 
areas where external contamination is possible. The contamination of surfaces 
may give rise to unwanted inhalation or ingestion of small quantities of 
uranium. It may also interfere with laboratory measurements. Area monitor­
ing is also commonly performed in change rooms, administrative office areas, 
maintenance shops, and analytical laboratories. 
Often, the presence of uranium contamination (especially yellowcake) is 
detected by visual observation. In circumstances where the activity is not 
readily observed, the quantity and activity of the material present may be 
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determined with alpha-beta survey instruments and filter-smear sampling. 
Sampling should be performed regularly or whenever there is a need for spec­
ial surface monitoring. 
A carefully planned program of facility monitoring can provide important 
information about the temporal changes in occupational radiation environment, 
and indicate the direction of trends that may require corrective action. In 
this way, facility monitoring can contribute greatly to worker protection. 
Table 4 shows suggested mill locations for surveillance activities. 
4.3 EXPOSURE CONTROL IN URANIUM MILLS 
During the first years of uranium processing, it was generally assumed 
that exposure of workers to uranium dust, radon, or radon daughters would 
not lead to harmful health effects. However, more recent epidemiological 
investigations, improved internal dosimetry, and more stringent regulatory 
control have resulted in increased awareness. regarding the health protection 
of workers. Airborne concentrations of uranium ore dust, yellowcake dust, 
radon daughters, and uranium compounds, and exposures to external gamma 
radiation have been considerably reduced from levels experienced in previous 
years. This section discusses methods that can and should be implemented at 
uranium mills to maintain radiation exposures to levels that are as low as can 
reasonably be achieved utilizing current technology. 
The control of radiation exposures is required by the Code of Federal 
Regulations, and the content of a plant's personnel protection program must 
be approved by the licensing authority. The required margin of radiological 
safety and the control of occupational radiation exposures may be accomp­
lished through optimal use of process-related safety systems, basic engi­
neering design, respiratory protection programs, the use of other protective 
clothing, and employee training 
further discussed below. 
and review programs. These elements are 
4.3.1 Process Safety Engineering 
Containment dependability, dust collection, and indoor area ventilation 
are the primary design features that prevent airborne radioactive materials 
from reaching unacceptable levels, and keep chemical spills or other liquid 
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TABLE 4. Suggested Facility Monitfljng Locations in Mills 
and Type of MeasureLlent 
Work Area Type of Monitoring Required (b) 
Coarse ore storage G R U 
Primary rock crusher G R U 
Fine ore bins 	 G R U 
Ballor rod mill G R U 
Ore conveyor system G R U 
Leach tanks 	 G R 
CCD settling tanks G R 
Solvent exchange G R 	 .. 
Precipitation circuit G R U 
Yellowcake dryer G R U 
Yellowcake packager G R U 
Laboratories G R C 
Change rooms G R C 
Lunchroom G R C 
Administrative offices G R C 
Maintenance shops G R C 
(a) 	To determine occupational exposure to radioactivity. 
Does not include monitoring required for environ­






~external gamma radiation survey 
R = air sampling for radon daughters 
U = air sampling for uranium aerosols 
C = surface contamination surveys 
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releases from entering noncontained areas of the uranium mill. The incorpo­
ration of safety engineering practices has increased with the construction of 
newer facilities, but many problems still exist at older facilities. In most 
instances, the production equipment is designed to handle dispersible uranium 
in a contained system. However, maintenance procedures are frequently re­
quired, and failure of mechanical equipment provides opportunities for breach 
of containment. Each facility should be reviewed to see if the engineering is 
adequate to insure that exposures are as low as possible. Needed changes 
should be implemented. 
Ventilation systems have been added to older plants to reduce indoor 
dust levels. Ventilation is particularly important in maintaining radon and 
radon daughter levels within recommended limits. 
Mills should utilize the following design and process safety systems which 
help control occupational exposures: 
• 	 ventilation-dust collection system in the crusher building, 
• 	 dust collection system located over the fine ore storage bins, 
• 	 ventilation-dust collection system in the sample preparation room, 
• 	 leach tank exhaust system, 




• 	 ventilation system in the yellowcake precipitation area, and 




One mill is planning to implement an entirely wet yellowcake production 
process to reduce the potential for inhalation of radioactive materials. The 
process would include wet crushing of the ore and shipment of the final 
yellowcake product as a slurry to the conversion facility. 
4.3.2 Respiratory Protection 
Although uranium dusts are only mildly radioactive, the radiotoxicological 
effects of chronic inhalation of uranium are still not well known. Since the 
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chemical toxicity of uranium compounds taken into the body may be greater 
than the radiological toxicity, it is prudent to provide a measure of respir­
atory protection for the uranium worker. Inhalation represents the primary 
pathway for intake of radioactive materials and other hazardous nonradioactive 
chemicals by workers in uranium mills. Most of the exposure can be pre­
vented by following a suitable respiratory protection program supervised and 
enforced by management. 
In those areas of the plant where controls are insufficient to maintain 
general air uranium concentrations consistently below allowable limits as given 
in 10 CPR 20 Appendix B, and during hazardous maintenance operations, the 
use of respirator masks is advised. However, respirator use should not be 
sUbstituted for proper design and operation of process equipment. Optimum 
equipment design and routine maintenance of machinery should make the use 
of respirators unnecessary. However, this is rarely the situation. 
Respirators should be worn all or part of the time in the following areas: 
• 	 crushing - particularly when low moisture ores are being crushed 

which result in high airborne dust concentration. 

• 	 yellowcake drying and packaging area - most mills require workers 

to wear respirators at all times in these areas. 





Respirators should be readily available for use when needed. For ade­
quate protection, respirators should be properly fitted to the face. The 
safety training program should include instructions on the care, storage, and 
fitting of respiratory devices. Guidance for the appropriate use of respir­
ators is specified in Title 29 Code of Federal Regulations Part 1910.134, ANSI 
Standard Z88. 2 (ANSI 1969), U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Guide 8.15 
(USNRC 1976a), and NUREG-0041 (USNRC 1976b). 
4.3.3 	 Contamination Control and Protective Clothing 
The purpose of contamination control is to limit the quantities of radio­
active materials that may at some time enter the body through ingestion or 




however, tools and machinery, floors, worker's clothing and shoes, and other 
surfaces near the process equipment become contaminated with small amounts 
of radioactivity--especially in the yellowcake precipitation, drying, and 
packaging areas. These areas need to be hosed down with water at regular 
intervals to recover the product and prevent the uranium from becoming air ­
borne. The objective of contamination control is to prevent the spread of 
radioactivity from the process area to administrative offices, lunchrooms, 
laboratories, or contamination of street clothing and items taken from the mill 
for repair or disposal. 
Overalls or other work clothing must be provided and laundered by the 
plant daily. Change rooms with lockers should be located in a buffer zone 
between the process and administration areas. The worker should be re­
quired to wear clothing and boots supplied by the company, and to change 
and shower before leaving at the end of the work shift. Where necessary, 
workers should be instructed to change clothing and scrub hands, arms, and 
face thoroughly before going to lunch. Obviously those workers in process 
areas where contamination is not a possibility would not be required to take 
the same precautions as workers in areas of the plant with frequent contact 
with uranium compounds. 
Monitoring for area contamination was discussed in Section 4.2.3. Con­
tamination of less than 4 pCi/cm2 (10 dpm/cm2) indicates good housekeeping 
and a successful contamination control program. Review of contamination 
monitoring records should be used to detect unfavorable trends. 
4.4 	 TRAINING 
Training develops an employee's versatility and should foster a greater 
interest in his work. Adequate training also leads to improved safety and 
fewer opportunities for error. 
Uranium mill facilities are required by the licensing authority to provide 
a radiological protection training program for all employees who will work with 
or around radioactive materials. New employee orientation should begin 
before the worker is assigned to hazardous responsibilities. Periodic testing 
of the employee's knowledge and skills, and continuing on-the-job training are 
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also required. The facility must issue a description of the training program 
(including copies of radiological safety instructions given to each employee) 
when submitting application for an operating license. The following items 
must be included: 
• 	 personal hygiene, including on-site washing and showering, 
• 	 surveying for contamination prior to eating or leaving the plant, 
• 	 instructions for wearing personnel monitoring devices and respirators, 
• instructions for good housekeeping and contamination control. 
Since the laborer is probably unfamiliar with the nature of ionizing radiation, 
the basic training program should also include: 
• 	 general health effects of routine occupational exposure to radio­





• 	 emergency procedures 
• 	 purpose and use of protective clothing 
• 	 a description of the company's medical program 
• 	 the importance of following instructions and workplace rules. 
In the early history of uranium milling operations and uranium 
processing, formal training programs were not instituted. Training, if any, 
came with experience. At some mills, an AEC information booklet on radiation 
effects was distributed to each employee. This situation no longer exists. 
All uranium mills have now instituted training programs. Some, for example, 
now give 24 class-hours of new employee indoctrination with follow-up 8 
class-hour refresher courses (with exams) annually. Each company selects 
the training program format suited to its own specific needs. The training 
program is then approved by the regulatory agency. 
The existence of a training program cannot guarantee that the instruc­
tions will be learned or followed. Each type of facility may have "problem 
employees" who have undesirable personal hygiene traits and who may casu­
ally disregard radiological safety rules. Reprimands from safety directors and 







Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations Part 20.401 requires each licensed 
uranium facility to maintain careful records showing radiation exposures of all 
individuals for whom personnel monitoring is required. Also, the facilities 
must maintain results of radiation surveys, monitoring, and dispositions of 
radioactive materials. This includes bioassay results. Records must be pre­
pared according to recommendations of the American National Standards Insti ­
tute (ANSI N13. 6, Practice for Occupational Radiation Exposure Records 
Systems, 1966), and must be kept on file for a minimum of two years. Facil ­
ities should, however, maintain these records indefinitely. 
The licenced facility must immediately report to the regulatory agency 
any loss, theft, or accidental release of radioactive materials. In addition, 
any overexposures, or conditions that could expose individuals to radiation 
levels in excess of maximum permissible limits must be reported immediately. 
The facility must also file a worker termination report to the regulator which 
summarizes the individual's radiation exposure history for the period of 
employment. Records and files are inspected annually by the regulatory 
agency for compliance to 10 CFR Part 20. 
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5.0 EXPOSURE EVALUATION 

Uranium mills are required to determine the extent of any worker's ex­
posure to radioactive materials (10 CFR Part 20). The dose from these mate­
rials when taken into the body cannot be adequately determined by personnel 
dosimeters or facility air monitoring equipment alone. Air monitoring may 
provide the initial indication that an overexposure may have occurred. How­
ever, breathing rates, use of respirators, proper operation of protective 
equipment, and ventilation rates may influence the amount of material de­
posited in the lungs. Time-weighted air monitoring is insufficient for 
determining internal doses to workers. 
Internal exposures can be estimated using bioassay techniques. Bioassay 
is the measurement of radiation emitted from the body using chest or whole­
body counting equipment, or the measurement of radioactive materials in 
biological samples taken from the body (blood, hair, urine, and feces). Uri­
nalysis is the primary type of bioassay required of uranium mills. 
It is important for mills to have the capability of determining worker 
exposures to uranium. Uranium exhibits both radiological and chemical toxic­
ity, and the objective of an adequate health and safety program is to protect 
the worker from both effects. The retention, metabolism, and ultimate degree 
of toxicity of uranium and its associated decay series products depend upon 
the chemical forms and specific activities of these elements. The chemistry of 
uranium determines its solubility in body fluids, and hence its retention time 
in body tissues. Although the specific activity of natural uranium is ex­
tremely low (1. 5 alpha disintegrations/min-llg), insoluble forms of uranium 
may remain in the body for long periods of time and accumulate during 
periods of chronic exposure. On the other hand, soluble uranium compounds 
leave the body more rapidly and may damage kidney cells. The following is a 
classification scheme for solubilities of uranium compounds in the lung: 
• 	 Class D - soluble (transportable) compounds with a solubility half­

time (time for half of the compounds to be dissolved in 












• Class W ­ moderately soluble (slowly-transportable) compounds with 
an estimated solubility half-time of >10 to 100 days inclusive. 
• Class Y - relatively insoluble (very slowly-transportable) compounds 
with an estimated solubility half-time of >100 days. 
As part of their internal dosimetry assessment program, uranium mills should 
determine the solubility classification for all sources of respirable radioactive 
materials potentially affecting the worker. 
5.1 BIOASSAY 
Bioassay may be a "direct" or "indirect" method for assessing intakes of 
radioactive materials by workers. The major direct method is lung counting. 
Indirect methods include measurement of the radioactivity content of excreta 
(urine and feces), blood, or breath samples. A urine sample, for example, 
provides an indication of the amount of radioactive material that has left the 
body. To determine body burdens from urinalysis results, one must turn to 
accepted biological excretion models and back-calculate the body burden that 
would result in the observed excretion. 
Bioassay has become an important aspect of radiation protection in the 
uranium industry. Urinalysis can provide early indication of whether a 
worker has inhaled or ingested a significant quantity of uranium. The re­
sults can provide guidance for the type of corrective action that should be 
taken as a consequence of a suspected overexposure. Bioassay at uranium 
mills is required: 
• 	 to assist the facility in establishing a baseline excretion value for a 
new employee, or to detect any pre-existing body burdens that may 
have been received prior to employment 
• 	 to assist in the estimation of uranium intake by inhalation or 
ingestion, and to indicate levels warranting corrective or remedial 
action 
• 	 to verify the consistency and reliability of the air monitoring pro­
gram, and to watch for the development of unfavorable trends 
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• 	 to verify other forms of exposure control such as improvements 

made in process equipment or radiation safety procedures 

to follow up in the event that a worker has been removed from his• 
duties because of unacceptably high bioassay results, and to 
indicate the time at which bioassay levels have again become 
acceptable so that work restrictions may be removed (USAEC 1974). 
Regulatory Guide 8.22, Bioassay at Uranium Mills (USNRC 1978) is the 
primary guidance on bioassay programs at mills today. It indicates that 
routine bioassays should be performed on workers routinely exposed to air ­
borne yellowcake and/or airborne uranium ore dust. In addition, Regulatory 
Guide 8.22 suggests that bioassays should be performed on any worker sus­
pected of an exposure to yellowcake in excess of 4 x 10-9 j..lCi-hr/mt(air) 
during a period of one work-week or to uranium ore dust in excess of 5.2 x 
10-8 lJCi-hr/mt(air) during a period of one calendar quarter. 
Some questions still remain as to whether bioassay programs, costly and 
time consuming as they are, may in fact be considered as adequate methods of 
monitoring employee exposure to uranium. Because of the current contro­
versy surrounding the bioassay requirements as they now stand, a new regu­
latory guide is being prepared and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is ex­
panding its internal review of the urinalysis requirements. It is expected 
that bioassay will remain a requirement for uranium facilities, considering the 
justifications previously listed. Major improvements should be expected in the 
analytical methods and procedures used for determining the uranium content 
of urine samples. 
5.1.1 Methods of Bioassay 
Guidance for conducting a bioassay program is available from the NRC in 
Regulatory Guide 8.9 Acceptable Concepts, Models, Equations, and Assump­
tions for a Bioassay Program (USAEC 1973), 8.11 Applications of Bioassay for 
Uranium (USAEC 1974), 8.22 Bioassay at Uranium Mills (USNRC 1978), and 
from the document WASH-1251 Applications of Bioassay for Uranium (USAEC 











A minimum bioassay program may be instituted if the quarterly air sam­
pling shows that the average airborne uranium concentration in the worker's 
breathing zone does not exceed 10 percent of the appropriate Derived Air 
Concentration (DAC) given in Appendix B of 10 CFR, Part 20, and if the 
maximum result obtained to calculate the average does not exceed 25 percent 
of the DAC. The minimum bioassay program consists of an annual or semi­
annual urine sampling of all workers, and a more frequent sampling protocol 
for those who may be exposed to higher-than-average uranium concentrations. 
Regulatory Guide 8.22 indicates that urine samples should be collected at 
least every two weeks from potentially exposed mill workers. Analytical tech­
niques for determining uranium concentrations in the urine should have a 
minimum sensitivity of 5 'lJ.gl to 
In some cases, the mill may be able to demonstrate that airborne uranium 
concentrations are sufficiently low and air monitoring systems sufficiently 
adequate to make urinalysis unnecessary or less frequent than the two-week 
time interval suggested in Regulatory Guide 8.22. Strict adherence to regu­
latory guides requires a formal urinalysis program to be implemented wherever 
air sampling is required for purposes of occupational exposure control. Cur­
rently, there is a wide variation in the frequency of urinalysis for workers 
among mills. Of the several mills visited the following programs were 
observed: 
• biweekly urinalysis on crushers and yellowcake workers 
• biweekly urinalysis on all mill workers, or 
• annual urinalysis on all mill workers. 
Frequency of urinalysis is an important consideration. If delayed, sol­
uble uranium compounds may be excreted and inflict damage to kidneys before 
sample collections are made. It is recommended in Regulatory Guide 8.22 that 
specimens should be collected every two weeks. Urine specimens are normally 
collected when the worker returns to the mill following normal work interrup­
tion of from two to four days (but not longer than four days). This delay 
allows the worker to shower and remove external contamination from his body 





uranium may be excreted during the delay and thus go undetected when the 
sample is taken. To prevent contamination of the sample, the worker's hands 
should be clean, and the sample should be retrieved before the worker has 
changed into work clothing or entered contaminated areas of the mill. The 
system for establishing a collection frequency is outlined in Regulatory Guide 
8.11. With higher airborne uranium concentrations, urinalysis must be per­
formed more frequently. 
Laboratory methods for determining uranium concentrations in the urine 
are optional with the facility and are not specified in the regulatory guides. 
Ultraviolet fluorometry is most often the method of choice. This procedure is 
described in further detail in HASL Procedure Manual 300 (Harley 1972). 
Control specimens should be obtained from persons known to have no body 
burden of uranium other than that which one normally expects from the 
natural environment. To monitor the quality of the analysis from day to day, 
certain control specimens should also be spiked with known uranium to give a 
known concentration of 15 llgl R, and 30 llgl L The minimum detectable amount 
for the measurement technique should be 5 llg I R, uranium or less. 
5.1.1.2 In-Vivo Counting 
A standard method for determining intake of uranium is chest counting. 
However, this capability is beyond the current resources of most uranium 
mills. Chest counting services are available, however, from specialized 
subcontractors, one of which is equipped with mobile whole-body or chest 
counting laboratories. The in-vivo measurement for internally deposited 
uranium is performed using sodium iodide (thallium activated) solid crystal or 
phoswich detectors and a multichannel analyzer. Since the alpha emissions of 
238U do not penetrate the chest wall, the measurements of uranium in the 
lungs is based upon detection of either the 186 keY photon from 235 U or the 
234two photons from Th at 63 keY and 93 keV. 
Most uranium mill facilities have problems with high natural background 
rates. Mobile laboratories that service these facilities carry some shielding 
against background radiation. For quality results, it is recommended that 
chest counting be performed at institutions (national laboratories and some 










personnel capable of measuring and interpreting the results. For detection 
equipment, phoswich detectors with computer-based multichannel analyzers are 
generally regarded as the most efficient systems for lung counting. 
Since special expertise, equipment, and facilities are required to perform 
chest counting, it has not been feasible to require uranium mills to establish 
individual capabilities. A number of facilities do, however, contract for these 
services from independent sources. 
Regulatory Guide 8.22 suggests that in-vivo measurements (lung count­
ing) be performed annually using equipment capable of measuring 9 nCi or 
less uranium in the lung. 
5.1.2 Action Based on Bioassay Results 
Regulatory Guide 8.22 provides guidance for action by mill management 
based on results of bioassay measurements. Tables 5 and 6 show corrective 
action for urinalysis and lung counting results, respectively. 
5.2 ASSESSMENT OF EXTERNAL GAMMA EXPOSURES 
Two fundamental methods were described earlier for determining occupa­
tional exposures to penetrating gamma radiation: 1) personnel dosimeters and 
2) calculation from external survey results and a record of time spent by 
each worker in the particular working area. Currently, most personnel dosim­
eters are read monthly or quarterly by service contractors. Monthly expos­
ure results generally range from 0 to 40 mR, with very few (if any) in 
excess of 25 percent of the maximum permissible occupational limit of 
5 rem/yr. Some uranium mills have discontinued the use of personnel dosim­
eters after one or two years of monitoring experience. While some facilities 
badge all employees in the mill, other facilities limit dosimeter use to 




TABLE 5. Corrective Actions Based on Urinary Uranium Concentration Results 
(U. S. 
Urinary Uranium Concentration 
Less than 15 llgl i. 
15 to 30 llgl i. 
"'" "'" 
Greater than 30 llgl R, 
Greater than 30 llgl R, for four 
consecutive specimens or 




Uranium confinement and air sam­
pling capabilities are adequate. 
Uranium confinement and perhaps 
air sampling capabilities do not 
provide(1P adequate margin of 
safety. 
Uranium confinement and perhaps 
air samplin'a1apabilities are not 
acceptable. 




1. 	Confirm results (repeat urinalysis). 
2. 	 Determine why air samples were not 
representative and did not warn of 
excessive concentrations of airborne' 
uranium. Make corrections. 
3. 	 Identify the cause of airborne 
uranium and initiate additional 
control measures. 
4. 	Determine whether other workers 
could have been exposed and per­
form bioassay measurements for 
them. 
5. 	Consider work assignment limita­
tions to ensure the worker does not 
exceed urinary uranium concentra­
tion of 30 llgl L 
1. 	Take the actions given above for 
15 to 30 llgl i.. 
2. 	Continue operations only if it is 
virtually certain that no other 
worker will exceed a urinary 
uranium concentration of 
30 llgl i.. 
1. 	Take the actions given above. 
2. 	 Have additional urine specimen 
tested for albuminuria. 
• 

(a) Unless the result was anticipated and caused by conditions already corrected . 
,t 	 • 
• 	 , f 
TABLE 6. Corrective Actions Based on In-Vivo Results (from Regulatory Guide 8.22. U. S. NRC 1~78) 
Amount of Uranium Detected 
Below 9 nCi of uranium 
9 to 16 nCi 
A 
CJ1 
More than 16 nCi 
Interpretation 
This result does not necesssarily 
indicate that uranium confinement 
and air sampling capabilities are 
confined. 
Confinement and ail( ,ampling cap­
abilities unreliable. a Uranium 
activity in lungs undesirably 
high. 
Confinemen~a~nd air sampling not 
acceptable. 
Actions 
Rely on urinalysis results to determine 
corrective actions. 
1. 	 Confirm results (repeat urinalysis). 
2. 	Determine why air samples were not 
representative and did not warn of 
excessive concentrations of airborne 
uranium. Make corrections. 
3. 	Identify the cause of airborne uran­
ium and initiate additional control 
measures. 
4. 	Determine whether other workers 
could have been exposed and per­
form bioassay measurements for 
them. 
5. 	Consider work assignment limita­
tions that will permit the lung 
burden to be reduced through 
natural elimination; ensure that 
the lung burden does not exceed 
16 nCi. 
1. 	Take the actions given above for 
9 to 16 nCi. 
2. 	Establish work restrictions for 
affected workers. (Normally, 
workers with a lung burden greater 
than 16 nCi are not allowed by 
their employer to resume work 
in airborne activity areas 
until the burden is reduced to 
less than 9 nCi.) 
3. 	Perform individual case studies 
(bioassays) for affected workers. 
4. 	Continue operations only when it 
is certain no additional workers 
will exceed 16 nCi. 
(a) Unless the result was anticipated and caused by conditions already corrected. 
6.0 REGULATION OF URANIUM MILLS 
Uranium mills were licensed and regulated by the AEC or by agreement 
states until 1974, when the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 transferred 
this responsibility to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) or agreement 
states. (a) The NRC retains the authority to regulate uranium mills in non­
agreement states. Licensing requirements in agreement states must be no less 
stringent than those in NRC-licensed nonagreement states. Another regula­
tory agency that has jurisdiction over uranium mills is the Mining Safety and 
Health Administration (MSHA), which has authority to enforce radiation and 
safety standards. 
The licensing of uranium mills is governed by the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954 (amended). In nonagreement states, uranium mills that process or refine 
ores containing 0.05 percent or more of uranium by weight are required to 
have an NRC source material license. An application for such a license 
should be in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 40, "Licensing of 
Source Material." General guidance on the format and content of the license 
application is provided by NRC Regulatory Guide 3.5 (USNRC 1977). In 
agreement states, a similar application must be presented to the appropriate 
state regulatory agency. 
The license application serves as the principal technical communication 
between the applicant and the NRC. Each applicant must demonstrate in the 
application that the design of the facility, together with proposed operating 
procedures, will ensure the degree of safety required by regulations. While 
all applicants are licensed by NRC, different processes may require different 
measures being applied to protect workers. (Regulatory aspects dealing with 
environmental issues are beyond the scope of this report.) 
(a) 	 An agreement state refers to any state with which the regulatory agency 
has entered into an agreement under Section 274b of the Atomic Energy 
Act of 1954 (as amended) to conduct the licensing and regulation of 
facilities within that state. The first such agreement was initiated in 
1962. Colorado, Florida, Louisiana, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington 











Part of the regulatory procedure includes semiannual inspections of 
licensed mills by NRC inspectors (or by state inspectors in agreement states). 
These inspections, along with periodic renewal of a mill's source material 
license, are used by regulators to verify that mills are complying with the 
conditions specified in the license. 
Mills must comply with the radiation protection standards found in 
10 CPR 20, "Standards for Protection Against Radiation." Initially written in 
January 1957 and updated annually, 10 CPR 20 has undergone over one hun­
dred changes. In 1970, the AEC began issuing safety guides (now called 
regulatory guides) to assist applicants and licensees in complying with the 
general requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations. Regulatory guides 
reflect the current NRC staff position for licensing facilities. Thus, the 
practices described within such guides are used as a basis for evaluation of 
license applications. Compliance with the regulatory guides themselves is not 
required; individual applicants or licensees may propose alternatives for new 
or existing programs that are not necessarily consistent with the guides. 
The justification for such alternatives is reviewed by the NRC staff and 
evaluated on a case-by-case basis. 
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7.0 SURVEY OF CURRENT PRACTICES 
Questionnaires were sent to all operating conventional and unconventional 
uranium milling facilities in the United States during the period June­
September 1981. The survey included questions about production and employ­
ment levels, process descriptions, methods of facility monitoring, and expos­
ure evaluation data. Questions were written in simple, multiple-choice format. 
Responses were received from most of the facilities contacted, as summarized 
in Table 7 below. 
TABLE 7. Summary of Questionnaire Response 





















Total 38 27 71 
7.1 CONVENTIONAL MILLS .. 
Production and employment information obtained from 14 conventional 
uranium mills is given in Table 8. The identity of the facilities is not given 
to respect rights of confidentiality. Some of the questions were considered 
proprietary, and the requested information was not provided by the company. 
-
-
Two categories of workers with greatest potential for inhalation of air­
borne radioactive materials are the crusher area workers, and the yellowcake 
drying/packaging workers. Each group constituted about 6 percent of the 
total mill work force. 
The survey indicated strong preference for production of insoluble, 
high-fired yellowcake product. Seventy percent of the mills reported use of 
drying temperatures above 500o C. The remaining mills reported a variety of 
lower-temperature drying processes. 
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TABLE 8. Conventional Mills Production and Employment Data 
Yellowcake Workers in Total Workers 
Average Ore Grade Tons of Ore Production Workers in Drying and Operation and 
Mill (%U30 8) - Processed I Day (!ons/yJ:>t Crusher Area Packaging Area Maintenance 
1 0.18 750 526.5 	 8 4 55 
2 0.25 acid 1500 900 	 5 12 225 
O. 15 alkaline 
3 0.17 1368 Confidential 	 6 4 190 
4 0.081 3400 400 4 4 79 
5 Confidential 1000 Confidential 2 3 28 
6 0.10-0.15 3000 1000 8 3 55 
4(a) 
~ 7 0.125 1400-1450 600 	 4 47 
<.0 
8 0.18 1700 1000 	 6 4 66 
9 	 0.099 983 264 14 9 58 
3(a)10 	 0.17 1500 900 6 40 
O(b)11 0.05 1 x 106 500 	 4 80 
12 	 0.128 500 185 4 5 37 
O(b)13 0.075 2200 500 4 36 
14 Confidential Confidential Confidential 3 3 77 -
Total 	 67 69 1073 
(a) Wet grinding. 
(b) No crushing area. 
All facilities sample for airborne uranium in the ore crushing areas. The 
most common method is monthly air-filter grab sampling. 
All facilities sample air for uranium in the drying and packaging area. 
Sixty-four percent perform weekly grab sample measurements; 14 percent con­
ducted continuous air monitoring. 
Only a single facility reported no sampling for radon daughters in the 
ore crushing section. Among those facilities that do conduct radon daughter 
measurements. sampling frequencies vary from weekly to quarterly. Over 
90 percent employ the Kusnetz method for determining radon daugther concen­
trations. 
All facilities measure external gamma radiation levels in and around the 
process areas. Portable gamma survey instruments and fixed-location TLD 
monitors are commonly used. Measurements are performed monthly (50 per­
cent) or quarterly (50 percent). 
Eighty percent of the mills conduct urinalysis of all workers. The re­
maining mills conduct urinalysis only on workers with increased potential for 
exposure. such as precipitation. drying. and packaging workers. and main­
tenance workers. The frequency of bioassay varies from biweekly to annu­
ally. At 20 percent of the mills contacted. the sampling frequency is related 
to job category; yellowcake workers are sampled biweekly whereas crushermen 
are sampled on an annual basis. All mills reported that their average urinal­
ysis result is less than 8 ].lg uranium per liter urine. 
Chest counting is performed routinely at 64 percent of the mills in the 
survey. Chest counting is performed only for special situations at 14 percent 
of the sites. while the remainder (22 percent) have never conducted chest 
counting of employees. 
Eighty-six percent of mills in the survey reported requiring all workers 
to wear personnel external gamma dosimeters. Fourteen percent require 
dosimeters for a limited number of potentially exposed workers. TLD badges 
are used at 86 percent of the facilities. and film badge dosimeters are 
employed at the remaining 14 percent. Dosimeters are evaluated either 
monthly (64 percent) or quarterly (36 percent). One site reported biweekly 












All mills reported mandatory use of respirators by yellowcake drying and 
packaging operators, Fifty percent require respirators during maintenance 
activities and only 21 percent require crushermen to wear respirators, 
7,2 SOLUTION MINING/YELLOWCAKE PRODUCTION PROCESSES 
Production and employment data for eight of the currently operating solu­
tion mining operations are presented in Table 9, Four of these facilities ship 
uranium as a slurry rather than a powder and therefore require no workers 
in the yellowcake drying and packaging area. Yellowcake drying and pack­
.' 	
aging workers at the other solution mines represent about 7 percent of the 
total workforce. 
Three out of four of the solution mines that ship their product as 
powder have product drying temperatures in excess of 500o C. Half of these 
facilities conduct continuous air monitoring in the vicinity of drying and 
packaging operations. The remainder perform weekly or quarterly air filter 
grab sampling. 
TABLE 9. Solution Mining Production and Employment Data 
Ore Grade in Yellowcake Workers in 
Mine Field Production Drying and Total 
Operation (%U3.2s_)_ (tons/year) Packaging Area Workers 
O(a)1 Confidential Confidential 15 
O(a)2 	 Confidential Confidential 30 
3 0.16 100 	 3 70 
4 0.129 90 	 3 41 
5 0.17 500 	 12 153 
6 0.15 450 	 19 133 
7 	 0.10 75,000(b) O(a) 34 
O(a) 32 
Total 37 
8 	 0.037 36 
508 
(a) No product drying. 
(b) Weight as slurry. 
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Each facility conducts external gamma radiation monitoring throughout 
the plant using portable survey instruments and fixed-location TLDs. 
Measurements are evaluated at monthly or quarterly intervals. A urinalysis 
program for all workers is in place at 62 percent of the solution mining 
facilities. The remaining sites conduct urinalysis measurements only on 
yellowcake precipitation or packaging and maintenance workers. The sampling 
frequency is highly variable. One facility conducts weekly urine sampling, 
while others obtain biweekly, monthly, quarterly, or annual samples. 
Average results are reported to be less than 5 lJgl L 
Routine chest counting is not performed at any of the facilities. Each 
facility monitors personnel exposures to external gamma radiation. One facil ­
ity reported use of film dosimeters, while the remainder use TLDs. Use of 
respirators is mandatory in the yellowcake drying and packaging area at each 
facility that produces a dry product. 
7.3 URANIUM RECOVERY OPERATIONS 
Employment and production information on four responding uranium re­
covery operations is presented in Table 10. 
Of the two facilities that provided process information. one utilizes a 
400° to 500°C yellowcake drying process, and the other ships its product as a 
yellowcake slurry. 
TABLE 10. Uranium Recovery Operations Production and Employment Data 
Yellowcake Product Drying 
Operation 
Production 





1 14 O(a) 58 
2 200 6 55 
3 (b) (b) (b) 
4 Confidential Confidential Confidential 
(a) No product drying. 








All four operations sample continuously for airborne uranium during pro­
duct drying and packaging operations. However, only one of the facilities 
conducts a radon daughter monitoring program. 
All workers are involved in a biweekly urinalysis program. Three facil ­
ities reported an average urinalysis result less than 5 llg uranium per liter 
urine, and one reported an average of 9 to 12 llg/ L 
Chest counting is routinely performed at two operations, infrequently at 
a third, and only following suspected overexposures at the fourth. 
Personnel external gamma dosimeters are worn by employees at each 
uranium recovery facility. Three employ TLD badges; the fourth employs film 
badges. Dosimeters are processed monthly or quarterly. 
Respirators are required during all drying and packaging operations. 
7.4 HEAP-LEACHING PROCESSES 
One of the three current heap-leaching operations completed the ques­
tionnaire. The operation has only one worker in yellowcake drying and pack­
aging area during operating hours. Six different workers are rotated in and 
out of this position. 
The yellowcake product is dried at between 3000 and 400 0 C. Daily grab 
samples for airborne uranium are taken in the drying and packaging area. 
Quarterly radon daughter measurements are taken inside the mill building. 
External gamma radiation measurements are taken monthly using portable sur­
vey instruments. TLDs placed at fixed locations throughout the mill are also 
read at quarterly intervals. 
Urinalysis is conducted on all mill workers. Workers in the product 
drying area require monthly urinalysis, and all other workers receive 
quarterly urinalysis. Results average <5 llg/ L Lung counting is routinely 
performed. However, personnel external gamma dosimeters are not worn. 
Respirator usage is mandatory during product drying and packaging opera­
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